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TOURO LA WREVIEW
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Johnson'
(decided Dec. 22, 2003)
James Johnson was indicted for criminal possession of a
weapon after a loaded handgun was found in the glove
compartment of a rented vehicle he was driving. The hearing
court granted Johnson's motion to suppress the gun, finding that it
was discovered by an illegal search,3 which would violate the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution.' The appellate
division reversed the hearing court finding that the police
recovered Johnson's loaded handgun pursuant to a valid inventory
search of his vehicle.6 The New York Court of Appeals reversed
and held the inventory search invalid due to the government's
failure to prove the existence of a standardized inventory search
procedure.7 Moreover, in the event that such a procedure did exist,
'No. 155, 2003 WL 22989705 (N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003).
2id.
3 Id. at *2.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause. ...
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I § 12 provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause. .. "
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the government offered neither evidence that the policy's means
were "rationally designed to meet the objectives" of a permissible
inventory search nor evidence that the police officer in this
particular case effectuated a proper inventory search.'
The arresting officer and his partner, members of a
plainclothes street crime unit formed to deal with "aggressive
crimes," were patrolling an area of Harlem in an unmarked car
when they observed Johnson's vehicle, bearing Virginia license
plates, weaving in and out of traffic at a high rate of speed and
without always using a turn signal.9 The officers followed Johnson
for about eight minutes; during this time they observed other
vehicles and pedestrians moving out of the path of the vehicle."°
After pulling Johnson over, one of the officers noticed him
reaching over and opening then closing his glove compartment."
The officer informed Johnson that he was "driving kind of
reckless" and requested that he produce his license and
registration, whereupon Johnson furnished his license, but claimed
that he did not have the rental agreement for the vehicle. '2 The
officer suggested that Johnson look in the glove compartment for
the agreement, but Johnson stated that it was not in there.'3
Subsequently, a report on Johnson's license showed it was
suspended; the officer had Johnson exit the vehicle, conducted a
8 Id. (citing People v. Galak, 610 N.E.2d 362, 365 (N.Y. 1993)).
9 Id. at *1.
10 Id.
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pat-down search and directed Johnson to wait at the back of the
vehicle.'4 At this time the officer had yet to inform Johnson that he
was under arrest for driving with a suspended license. 5 The
officer then opened the vehicle's glove compartment and, finding a
loaded handgun which he left in the glove compartment,
handcuffed Johnson and escorted him to the precinct. 6 Johnson
claimed that he was a bodyguard and the gun was for protection. 7
No inventory forms were completed at the scene or the precinct;
however, a stop and frisk report completed by the officer stated
that a loaded firearm was recovered during a search incident to
arrest." The vehicle was not vouchered at the precinct and upon
production of the rental agreement, the vehicle was returned to
Johnson's wife. 9
The hearing court granted Johnson's motion to suppress the
gun, rejecting the government's argument that the gun was
recovered pursuant to a valid inventory search.2" The court based
its decision on a lack of evidence of standardized procedures for
conducting such searches.2  The appellate division reversed,
141d.
15 Id.
16 Johnson, 2003 WL 22989705, at * 1.
17 id.
"S Id. at *2.
19 Id
20 id.
21 Johnson, 2003 WL 22989705, at *2. Additionally, the hearing court found
the government's claim of an inventory search was:
less than a believable claim and it appears to be merely a
pretext to cover for what was the officer's desire in the first
place, to see what the defendant was up to and to somehow get
into the interior of his car to see if the defendant was in
possession of contraband or the weapon.
[Vol 20
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relying on People v. Robinson,22 which was decided after the trial
court granted Johnson's motion to suppress the gun.23 In Robinson,
the New York Court of Appeals, adopting federal constitutional
law as a matter of state law, held:
[W]here a police officer has probable cause to
believe that the driver of an automobile has
committed a traffic violation, a stop does not violate
Article I, [Section] 12 of the New York State
Constitution. In making that determination of
probable cause, neither the primary motivation of
the officer nor a determination of what a reasonable
traffic officer would have done under the
circumstances is relevant.24
The appellate division reasoned that as long as the stop and
arrest of Johnson were lawful in the first instance, the officer's
motive in performing the inventory search was inconsequential.25
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
government failed to make a threshold showing that a valid
inventory search was conducted and further, that the appellate
division improperly applied the law governing pretext stops to
inventory searches. 26 First, the court noted that police can perform
inventory searches on impounded vehicles following the lawful
arrest of the driver.2' The purposes of an inventory search are to
"protect the property of the defendant, to protect the police against
Id. at *3.
22 767 N.E.2d 638 (N.Y. 2001).
23 Johnson, 2003 WL 22989705, at *3.
24 Robinson, 767 N.E.2d at 642.
2 5 Johnson, 2003 WL 22989705, at *3.
26 Id. at *2-*3.
27 Id. at *2.
2004]
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a claim of lost property, and to protect police personnel and others
from any dangerous instruments."2 However, inventory searches
"must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence"29 and therefore, an inventory search must
be conducted under "an established procedure clearly limiting the
conduct of individual officers that assures that the searches are
carried out consistently and reasonably."3  In this case, the
government failed to provide proof of a standardized method for
conducting inventory searches. 3 Furthermore, the court reasoned,
if a policy did exist, the People failed to show either that the officer
followed it32 or that it was "rationally designed to meet the
objectives that justify inventory searches in the first place,"33 such
as "accounting for the contents of the vehicle and to protect others
from harm, and that properly limit[ ] an officer's discretion."34
Further, since the officer only searched the glove compartment and
then left the loaded gun in the vehicle, the officer could not have
been following an established procedure.35  Valid inventory
28 Id. (citing Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)).
29 Id. (citing Wells, 495 U.S. at 4).
"°Johnson, 2003 WL 22989705, at *2 (citing Galak, 610 N.E.2d at 365)
(reasoning that the standardized procedures must "limit the discretion of the
officer in the field.").
31 Id.
32 Id. The officer testified that he was aware of the general objectives of
inventory searches and that searching just the glove compartment was pursuant
to such a search. Id.
31 Id. (citing Galak, 610 N.E.2d at 362).
34 Id.
35 Johnson, 2003 WL 22989705, at *2.
[Vol 20
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searches may reveal admissible incriminating evidence, but
uncovering such evidence cannot be the objective of the search.36
Additionally, "[t]he policy or practice governing inventory
searches should be designed to produce an inventory," and
therefore, a useable inventory must be created by the procedure.37
Yet, the officer in the instant case completed a stop and frisk report
claiming that the search was conducted incident to arrest, but did
not "fill out the hallmark of an inventory search: a meaningful
inventory list."38 Consequently, Johnson's motion to suppress the
handgun was granted and the indictment against him dismissed
because of the government's failure to prove the evidence resulted
from a valid inventory search of the impounded vehicle's glove
compartment.39
The United States Supreme Court has "consistently
sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or
otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at
securing or protecting the car and its contents."4 In South Dakota
3 6 
id.
37 Id. at *3 (citing Wells, 495 U.S. at 4).
38 id.
39/d.
40 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976). In Opperman, police
impounded the defendant's car after issuing multiple citations for violations of a
parking ordinance. The car was towed to a city lot where a police officer
observed a watch on the dashboard and other personal property on the car's back
seat and floorboard. The officer ordered the car unlocked and, using a standard
inventory form pursuant to standard police procedures, inventoried the contents
of the car. In the unlocked glove compartment, the officer found a plastic bag
containing marijuana, for which defendant was arrested and charged with
possession. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the
marijuana after he was convicted in a jury trial. The Supreme Court of South
2004]
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v. Opperman, the Court considered whether the inventory search of
a lawfully impounded vehicle, including the car's unlocked glove
compartment, violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Initially, the Court noted that although vehicles are
"effects" within the purview of the Fourth Amendment, they are
treated differently than homes or offices for Fourth Amendment
purposes and "warrantless examinations of automobiles have been
upheld in circumstances in which a search of a home or office
would not."'" One reason for the distinction is the lessened
expectation of privacy an individual has in a vehicle compared to
the expectation of privacy in the home or office42 because a
vehicle's "function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's
residence or as a repository of personal effects."43 Also, due to the
"inherent mobility" of a car, enforcement of a warrant requirement
would not be possible."
Furthermore, the ability of the police to perform
"community caretaking functions,"45 such as removing vehicles
from the streets when they obstruct traffic or threaten public safety,
is beyond reproach. 6 Once a vehicle is lawfully impounded, local
Dakota reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence resulted from a search
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 365-67.41 Id. at 367.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 368 (citing Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)).
44 Id. at 367.
45 Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441
(1973)).
46 Id. at 369. The Court recognized that state court decisions upheld these
caretaking procedures, if they even considered them searches, as reasonable and
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 370-71. Additionally, the
Court noted the higher number of occasions for state police departments to take
140 [Vol 20
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police can secure and inventory the vehicle's contents according to
a "routine practice" developed with the objectives of protecting the
owner's property, protecting the police from claims of lost or
stolen property and protecting the police from any dangerous
instrumentalities in the automobile.47  Therefore, the Court
reasoned, when the police are in lawful custody of a vehicle, taking
an inventory of the property for itemization purposes is reasonable
and this "reflects the underlying principle that the fourth
amendment [sic] proscribes only Unreasonable [sic] searches."4
On the other hand, "[i]t would be unreasonable to hold that the
police, having to retain the car in their custody ... had no right,
even for their own protection, to search it."49  Under Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, every search does not require a
warrant; rather, the amendment "prohibits only 'unreasonable
searches and seizures.""' ° Therefore, "[w]hether a search and
seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
case."
5'
Accordingly, the Court upheld the search in Opperman,
custody of a vehicle for noncriminal routine procedures while federal law
enforcement officers generally assume custody of a vehicle for criminal
investigatory purposes, thereby triggering the probable cause warrant
requirement. Id. at 371 nn.4-5.
4 Id. at 369.
48 Id. at 371 (citing United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375, 378 (5th Cir.
1973)).
49 Id. at 373 (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967)).
so Opperman, 428 U.S. at 372-73 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 509 (1971) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting)).
51 Id. at 375 (citing Cooper, 386 U.S. at 59).
2004]
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concluding that it was conducted by police using a "standard
procedure, essentially like that followed throughout the country,"
and was not a "pretext concealing an investigatory police motive,"
but rather, was a reasonable "caretaking search of a lawfully
impounded automobile."52 Moreover, inventorying the contents of
the unlocked glove compartment did not render the scope of the
search unreasonable because "once the policeman was lawfully
inside the car to secure the personal property in plain view, it was
not unreasonable to open the unlocked glove compartment, to
which vandals would have had ready and unobstructed access once
inside the car."53  Thus, the conduct of the police was not
"unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. 4
Therefore, under federal constitutional law, "reasonable
police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in
good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment."" In Colorado v.
Bertine, the Supreme Court upheld a standardized inventory
procedure that mandated the police to open closed containers and
52 Id. at 375-76.
5' Id. at 376 n.10.
54 Id. at 376.
55 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987). See United States v.
Lumpkin, 159 F.3d 983, 987 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding as constitutional
Illinois' unwritten inventory policy allowing the examination and inventory of
"front and rear seat areas, glove compartment, map case, sun visors, and trunk
and engine compartments" for all vehicles and boats in police custody); United
States v. Garner, 181 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding St. Paul,
Minnesota's inventory search policy which did not require officers to create an
inventory list on a specific form or conduct inventory searches in a particular
manner; written policy merely provided that inventory searches were to be
conducted prior to the vehicle being towed and allowed police to open a
container if they could not determine its contents from the exterior).
[Vol 20142
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list their contents.56 The Court reasoned, "an inventory search may
be 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment even though it is not
conducted pursuant to a warrant based upon probable cause" since
it not only serves the strong governmental interests in protecting
the owner's property and in guarding the police from danger, but
there is a "diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile."57
The Court noted that inventory searches implicate neither the
policies behind the warrant requirement nor the "related concept of
probable cause" because "[t]he standard of probable cause is
peculiarly related to criminal investigations, not routine, non-
criminal procedures."" Thus, incriminating evidence uncovered
during an inventory search of Bertine's van was admissible to
prove criminal charges against him because the police followed a
standard policy without acting in "bad faith or for the sole purpose
of investigation."59
16 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 n.6. In Bertine, the police inventoried the
defendant's impounded van at the arrest site after the defendant was taken into
custody for driving while intoxicated. Upon opening a closed backpack located
directly behind the front seat of the van, the officer discovered metal canisters
containing cocaine, methaqualone tablets, cocaine paraphernalia, and cash.
Bertine moved to suppress the evidence, contending that the inventory search of
the closed backpack and containers "exceeded the permissible scope" of an
inventory search under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court of
Colorado, relying on Fourth Amendment case law related to investigatory
searches, held that the inventory search violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
368-70.
57Id. at 371-72. The officer who conducted the search in Bertine testified that
the "vehicle inventory procedures of the Boulder Police Department are
designed for the '[pirotection of the police department,"' to guard against claims
of lost or stolen valuables, and to allow police to ensure that the vehicle contains
no dangerous weapons or explosives. Id. at 373 n.5.
58 Id. at 371.
59 Id. at 372. See United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 780-81 (8th Cir.
2003) (striking down an inventory search as unconstitutional because police
2004]
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However, inventory searches conducted without a
standardized policy are "not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment," and incriminating evidence discovered under
such conditions is not admissible.' In Florida v. Wells, relied on
by the New York Court of Appeals in Johnson, the Supreme Court
held that inventory searches must be carried out according to
"standardized criteria or established routine" so as to guard against
the subterfuge of investigatory searches cloaked as mere caretaking
procedures.6' Yet, with regard to policies dealing with the opening
of containers, the Court noted, "there is no reason to insist that they
be conducted in a totally mechanical 'all or nothing' fashion."'6
Rather, police procedures do not violate the Fourth Amendment
simply because they allow the officer "sufficient latitude to
determine whether a particular container should or should not be
opened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the
only recorded the incriminating property they recovered and not all the property
in the vehicle, as required by the department's inventory policy and finding the
search a pretext for what was really an investigatory motive since the officer's
failure to record defendant's lawful property implied that police were not "really
acting to ensure the safe return of property.").
60 Wells, 495 U.S. at 5.
61 Id. at 4. In Wells, the defendant consented to the police opening the trunk of
his impounded car after he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. A search
of the vehicle at the impound yard yielded two marijuana cigarette butts in an
ashtray and a locked suitcase in the trunk. Upon the officer's directive, the
suitcase was opened, revealing a garbage bag containing marijuana. Wells
moved to suppress the marijuana as resulting from a search violating the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court of Florida held that under Bertine, the police
procedure "must mandate either that all containers will be opened during an
inventory search, or that no containers will be opened" because "[tihere can be
no room for discretion." Id. at 2-3.
62 Id. The Court also stated that policies requiring all containers to be opened
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container itself."63 In Wells, however, like the police department in
Johnson, the Florida Highway Patrol "had no policy whatever with
respect to the opening of closed containers encountered during an
inventory search."'  Consequently, the Court concluded that the
search yielding the marijuana found in the defendant's impounded
vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment and the Florida Supreme
Court properly suppressed the evidence.65
New York's court holdings are consistent with United
States Supreme Court holdings in analyzing the constitutionality of
inventory searches." In People v. Galak, the New York Court of
Appeals considered the constitutionality of an inventory search
under both the Fourth Amendment and the New York
Constitution.67 The defendant, a passenger in the impounded
vehicle, was charged with various crimes after a search of the
vehicle revealed his dagger, blackjack and ignition device.6" The
officer who conducted the search completed an inventory report
63 Id. For example, a policy only requiring the opening of containers if the
officer cannot detect their contents by examining the exterior is a permissible
exercise of discretion. Id.
64 ld. at 4-5.
65 Wells, 495 U.S. at 5.
66 People v. Gonzalez, 465 N.E.2d 823, 825 (N.Y. 1984) (acknowledging the
Supreme Court's ruling upholding the opening of containers as part of an
inventory search in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) and deeming it
"desirable to keep the law of this State consistent with the Supreme Court's
rulings on inventory searches...
67 Galak, 610 N.E.2d at 363.
68 Id. at 364. Defendant Galak was charged with criminal possession of a
weapon, sale or possession of master or manipulative keys for motor vehicles
and possession of burglary tools. Id.
2004]
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some five hours after another officer drove the car back to police
headquarters.69
At Galak's suppression hearing, the county court held the
search to be reasonable and the incriminating evidence admissible;
the appellate division affirmed the judgment of conviction.7 ° The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that the
"department's policy is so unrelated to the governmental interests
it is intended to promote and so lacking in appropriate safeguards
against police abuse that it does not survive constitutional
scrutiny."'" First, the court reasoned, procedures governing
inventory searches must be "rationally designed to meet the
objectives that justify the search in the first place."72 Additionally,
while there is no requirement that departmental policies adopt an
all or nothing attitude, a policy must sufficiently limit the officer's
discretion to avoid searches becoming "an excuse for general
rummaging to discover incriminating evidence." '73
In Galak, the officer testified that he was unaware of any
written regulations for conducting inventory searches;74 rather,
69 Id.
70 Id. Both lower courts found that the inventory search was conducted
according to a standard procedure; because there was support in the record for
such a finding, the Court of Appeals was bound by it. Id.
71 Id. at 363.
72 Galak, 610 N.E.2d at 365 (citing Wells, 495 U.S. at 4).
73 id.
74 The fact that a policy is unwritten is not fatal to a finding that the procedure
passes constitutional muster. See People v. Thomas, 567 N.Y.S.2d 557, 558-59
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1991) (upholding an unwritten inventory procedure
requiring impounded cars to be inventoried to safeguard the owner's property
and to protect the police against claims of loss or theft; valuable objects, in the
officer's opinion, were to be noted on an evidence record); Lumpkin, 159 F.3d at
987-88 (upholding an unwritten inventory search policy allowing the engine
[Vol 20
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training officers and supervisors schooled field officers with on-
the-job training." Also, no inventory report was generated while
the search was conducted, even though the department maintained
a standard form for use during inventory searches; instead, the
report was filled out five hours after the search took place.76
Further, there was no standard for determining what items should
be taken into custody and which should be returned to the owner or
driver." While the official form included categories for cataloging
the car's equipment and vehicle damage, under the search
procedure only items retained by the police were required to be
listed.78 Finally, although the property owner received a copy of
the form, it failed to specify what items were returned, which were
left in the car, and the property owner was not required to sign a
receipt showing that his property had been returned.79
Consequently, on these facts, the court held that the
'procedure was so unrelated to the underlying justification for
inventory searches that we have no difficulty finding it to be
compartment to be searched on the undisputed testimony of the officer that the
search was conducted according to standard operating procedure). Cf Rowland,
341 F.3d at 779-80 (rejecting the government's argument that the court can
consider unwritten and written policies in determining what comprises the
inventory search procedure of a law enforcement agency when an unwritten
policy conflicts with a written one).
" Galak, 610 N.E.2d at 365. The officer also agreed with defense counsel's
account that instead of following particular inventory search instructions,
officers used their judgment at the scene. Id.
76 Id.
7 Id. at 365-66. The officer testified that "some kinds of contraband or
weapons" were vouchered and that defendants "usually take [their money or
valuables]." Id. at 366.
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arbitrary and irrational, and the search it generated unreasonable.""0
The procedure failed to do what it was supposed to do - generate
a usable inventory." Moreover, the procedure gave the officers
unconstitutionally broad discretion in conducting the search. 2
Rejecting the government's argument that police exercised
permissible discretion in determining which property to keep and
which to give back only after the search was completed, the court
reasoned that with such "'uncanalized discretion' . . . there is
created not just the possibility but the probability that the search
and seizure of a citizen's personal effects will be conducted
inconsistently, subject to caprice and the personal preferences of
the individual officers - in short, it will be conducted
arbitrarily." 3 Accordingly, the court concluded that the search, as
conducted under the police department's inventory policy, was
unreasonable and, therefore violated both the Fourth Amendment
and Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution."
On the other hand, inventory searches that are reasonable
and conducted under a "'singular familiar standard' or established
police agency procedure," and limiting the discretion of the
searching officer are upheld as constitutional in New York." In




84 Id. at 367. The court expressly stated that it was not deciding what
constituted timely completion of an inventory report, nor whether unwritten
inventory policies are constitutionally permissible. Id. at 366.
85 People v. Salazar, 640 N.Y.S.2d 167, 168 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1996) (citing
Galak, 610 N.E.2d at 362).
[Vol 20
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People v. Salazar, the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle
stopped for speeding by a New York State police trooper; the car
was impounded after the trooper established that the driver and
defendant had suspended licenses.8 6  While conducting an
inventory search, the trooper, searching specific areas and items as
per police inventory form "General 21," discovered a cellophane
bag the size of a brick in an unlocked bag in the trunk. 7 The
defendant attempted to escape, leading the trooper to suspect that
the bag contained narcotics, and upon opening it, he found
cocaine." The court upheld the search as reasonable because the
trooper's testimony and the inventory search form completed by
the trooper while conducting the search established that the trooper
followed a standard operating procedure. 9 The court reasoned that
inventory of every item in the vehicle is not required, and the
procedure here was rationally designed to serve the purposes of an
inventory search as well as to limit the trooper's discretion to
ensure that he was not simply using the inventory search to
conduct an investigation."
Thus, both the federal and New York courts are in accord
in construing their respective constitutional search and seizure
provisions. Under the United States Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment holdings, determining the reasonableness of a search





90 Salazar, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
2004]
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individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers"'" and courts have adopted this
reasoning as the law in New York.92 In the case of inventory
searches, the governmental interests advanced - protecting the
owner's property, protecting the police against claims of lost or
stolen property and protecting the police from potential danger -
along with the individual's lessened expectation of privacy in an
automobile, justify allowing these warrantless searches.93
However, limitations on inventory searches imposed by the
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the New York
State Constitution, which require standardized procedures and limit
the discretion of the searching officer, protect citizens from
'arbitrary interference' by law enforcement.94  Given that
inventory searches can reveal admissible incriminating evidence
gathered as a result of a warrantless search and without the benefit
of an impartial magistrate issuing a warrant based on probable
cause, such protection is essential to guard against unreasonable
searches.
Denise Shanley
91 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
92 Galak, 610 N.E.2d at 364.
93 Id. at 364-65.
'4 Id. at 366.
[Vol 20
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